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 COURSE 
NAME: 
International Trade 
TERM: Fall 
PROFESSOR: Alessandra Bonfiglioli 
PROGRAM: Master in International Trade, Finance and Development 
ECTS:  
HOURS: 20 
OVERVIEW: This course will analyze the causes and consequences of international trade and 
foreign direct investment. You will learn the tools necessary to understand why 
nations trade, what they trade, and who gains from this trade. We will then study 
the motives for countries to restrict or regulate international trade, and the tools that 
are used.  
The lectures will be based partly on the textbook and partly on the original articles.  
OUTLINE: For all topics, lecture notes are the main references. 
(*) denotes mandatory readings. 
1. Facts + Gains from Trade + Comparative Advantage (1 lecture) 
(*)WTR, chapters II A and B 
MMKM, chapters 1 and 5 
2. Ricardian Model (1 lecture) 
(*)Dornbusch R., S. Fischer and P. Samuelson (1977) “Comparative Advantage, 
Trade and Payments in a Ricardian Model with a Continuum of Goods,” American 
Economic Review 67(5), 823-839 
MMKM, chapter 7 
(*)WTR, chapter II C.1 
3. HO + empirics (2 lectures) 
MMKM, chapter 8 
(*)WTR, chapter II C.1 
(*)Romalis, J. (2004) “Factor Proportions and the Structure of Commodity Trade,” 
American Economic Review 94(1), 67-97. 
(*)Trefler, D. (1995) “The Case of the Missing Trade and Other Mysteries,” 
American Economic Review 85, 1029-1046. 
4. Increasing Returns and Imperfect Competition (2 lectures) 
MMKM, chapter 12 
(*)WTR, chapter II C.2 
Anderson, James E. and Eric Van Wincoop (2003) “Gravity with Gravitas: A 
Solution to the Border Puzzle,” American Economic Review 93(1), 170-192. 
(*)Debaere, Peter (2005) “Monopolistic competition and trade, revisited: testing the 
model without testing for gravity,” Journal of International Economics 66, 249-266. 
 (*)Krugman, P. (1980) “Scale Economies, Product Differentiation, and the Pattern 
of Trade,” American Economic Review 70, 950-59. 
(*)McCallum, J. (1995) “National Borders Matter: Canada-US Regional Trade 
Patterns,” American Economic Review 85, 615-623 
5. Exporters and MNEs (2 lectures) 
(*)WTR, chapter II C.3 
(*)Bernard, A., B. Jensen, S. Redding and P. Schott. (2007) “Firms in International 
Trade,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 21(3), 105–130. 
Helpman E. (2006) “Trade, FDI and the Organization of Firms” Journal of Economic 
Literature 44, 589-630. 
(*)Melitz, M. (2003) “The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and 
Aggregate Industry Productivity,” Econometrica 71(6), 1695-1725.  
(*)Helpman E., M. Melitz and S. Yeaple (2004) “Export versus FDI with 
Heterogeneous Firms” American Economic Review 94, 300-316. (empirical part) 
(*)Trefler, D. (2004) “The Long and Short of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
 1 
 Agreement,” American Economic Review 94(4), 870-895. 
6. Trade Policy and the WTO (2 lectures) 
(*)MMKM, chapters 15, 18, 19, 20  
Bagwell, K. and R. Staiger (1999) “An Economic Theory of GATT,” American 
Economic Review, 89, 215-248.  
Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994) “Protection for Sale,” American Economic 
Review 84(4), 833-850. 
WTO (2007). World Trade Report 2007 – Six decades of multilateral trade 
cooperation: What have we learnt?. 
1. Bonfiglioli, A. (2011). Lecture Notes: available on the intranet TEXT BOOKS 
AND USEFUL 
READINGS: 
2. WTO (2008). World Trade Report 2008 – Trade in a Globalizing World 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report08_e.pd
f 
3. Markusen, J, J. Melvin, W. Kaempfer and K. Maskus (1995). “International 
Trade: Theory and Evidence” (MMKM). (for a basic introduction to most of the 
topics) 
This book can be downloaded at: 
http://spot.colorado.edu/%7Emarkusen/textbook.html
EVALUATION  Students will be evaluated through a written exam at the end of the course. 
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Practical Info
1 Lecture Notes: on the intranet before class
2 evaluation: 100% Final Exam on December 9, room TBA
3 o¢ ce hour: Tuesday at 15:00-16:00 in room 23.306
4 contact: alessandra.bonglioli@iae.csic.es
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What Is Globalization?
many dimensions, hard to dene!
for economists: international integration of commodity, capital and
labor markets.
not a new phenomenon: at least 2 waves of globalization since 1800s
(1850-1913 and 1950-present)
in the interwar period, international relationships collapsed
1960-2007: volume of trade, (import+export)/GDP, rose:
I 26% ! 86% (GER), 8% ! 60% (Spain), 21% ! 60% (UK),
I 8% ! 29% (US), 16% ! 75% (China),
I 5% ! 95% (Korea)
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Globalization Booms
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Main drivers of integration
1 technological innovations: faster and cheaper communication and
transportation
I railroad costs declined from 0.18$ per ton-mile in 1890 to 0.02$ in 2000
I air transport costs dropped by 92% between 1955 and 2004
I the cost of international calls in 2005 was 1/10th of the cost in 1955
(Germany)
2 political stimulus to cooperation and integration after WWII
(Marshall Plan, etc.)
3 economic policies: lower tari¤s and Non-tari¤ barriers (GATT, etc.)
I average import tari¤ fell from 14% in 1952 to 3.9% in 2005 (developed
countries)
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Public Attitude towards Globalization
globalization is perceived both as a threat and an opportunity
Pew Global Attitude Project: large survey (47 countries, more than
45.000 interviews)
in all nations, trade is perceived as benecial by the majority
support for globalization is weakening in industrialized countries:
in the US support for globalization fell from 78% in
2002 to 59% in 2007
on the contrary, approval of trade was 91% and 89% in
China and India
major concerns: inequality, threats to culture, to the environment,
immigration
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Some Facts about Globalization and Trade (I)
structure of trade:
North-North trade ' 52%
North-South trade ' 33%
South-South trade ' 15%
most of North-North trade is Intra-Industry Trade (IIT): simultaneous
import and export of similar products
North-South trade is the fastest growing component of world trade
the volume of trade varies with income
Export/GDP is:
24% in low income countries
37% in middle income countries
42% in high income countries
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Some Facts about Globalization and Trade (I)
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Who Are the Main Exporters?
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Who Are the Main Exporters?
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Some Facts about Globalization and Trade (II)
merchandise accounts for 70% of export (services 30%)
not all goods are traded
main traded products: computers, cars, chemicals, clothing,
intermediates, fuels and mining
agriculture accounted for 40% of trade in 1950, since 1995 it is less
than 10% and falling
not all rms export: in 2002 only 18% of US manufacturing rms
reported positive exports
only the most productive rms export
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What Do Advanced Countries Export?
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How many rms are exporters?
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Main Questions
why do countries trade?
why do they trade some products and not others? why does it vary
with development?
why do some rms export? why some become multinationals?
why is trade not free? how are trade policies determined?
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Plan of the Course
1 the gains-from-trade theorem, basic law of comparative advantage
2 trade between dissimilar countries (North-South): models based on
comparative advantage (Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin model) -
e¤ects of trade liberalization in China and India
3 trade between similar countries (North-North): models based on
increasing returns and product di¤erentiation
4 the role of domestic and multinational rms in trade
5 trade policy, the WTO at work, preferential trade agreements
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Gains from Trade (GFT) Theorem
is trade benecial for all countries?
under some assumptions, yes: trade is a positive-sum game!
consider a two-good case: X and Y
consider a small country that takes world prices, px and py as given
assume: convex preferences and technologies + perfect competition
! for any given price, the value of production is maximized
! GFT are always positive
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Gains from Trade Theorem: Graphical Illustration I
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Gains from Trade Theorem: Graphical Illustration II
YX = Production Possibility Frontier (PPF)
A = autarky: production=consumption
max value of production & max utility at the tangency between PPF and
indi¤erence curve UA
the slope of a tangent line through A is equal to the autarky equilibrium
relative price pA = px/py
the possibility to trade at a di¤erent international price (for example, p)
allows consumers to reach a higher indi¤erence curve
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Gains from Trade Theorem: Graphical Decomposition I
p = px/py = world relative price
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Gains from Trade Theorem: Graphical Decomposition II
1 from UA to UE ! gains from exchange: possibility to trade the
autarky basket
2 from UE to U ! gains from specialization: possibility to adjust the
production basket
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Gains from Trade Theorem: Analytical Proof I
at free-trade prices (px , py ), the free-trade production basket (xp , y p )
maximizes the value of output:
px x

p + p

y y

p  px xAp + py yAp
trade balance (value of production = value of consumption):
px x

p + p

y y

p = p

x x

c + p

y y

c
in autarky, production equals consumption (xAp = x
A
c , y
A
p = y
A
c ):
px x
A
p + p

y y
A
p = p

x x
A
c + p

y y
A
c
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Gains from Trade Theorem: Analytical Proof II
thus:
px x

c + p

y y

c  px xAc + py yAc
! in free trade, consumers can a¤ord the autarky consumption bundle
! the free trade consumption bundle must be preferred to the autarky
bundle
(or else consumers would pick the cheaper autarky bundle)
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Gains from Trade Theorem: Qualications
the GFT theorem says that a country benets form trade
yet, some individuals within a country may be worse (e.g., those who
loose jobs?)
in fact, in some cases free trade creates winners and losers
however, the GFT theorem says that:
trade generates enough resources that by redistributing resources
from the winners to the losers everybody can be made better-o¤
relative to autarky
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Gains from Trade Theorem: Failures
the GFT is an extremely powerful result
yet, it is by no means trivial
it hinges on the assumption that the value of production is maximized
at free trade prices
this property may not hold, for example, when there are increasing
returns to scale or imperfect competition
in the presence of distortions, free-trade need not be always benecial
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Law of Comparative Advantage I
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Law of Comparative Advantage II
import = consumption (Yc ) - production (Yp)
NOTE: a country imports the good that is cheaper in free trade than in
autarky
intuitively, countries gain from trade because they export goods whose
price are relatively higher in free trade and import goods whose prices are
relatively lower
! we can nd the patter of trade by comparing autarky and free trade
prices
NOTE (II): we dont need absolute advantage to have trade!
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Why do countries trade?
to exploit diversity
we will study two classes of trade models, based on di¤erent concepts of
diversity
1 Comparative Advantage models, where countries trade because
autarky prices di¤er from free trade prices due to di¤erences in:
I technology (Ricardian model) or
I factor endowments (Heckscher-Ohlin)
2 models with increasing returns, where countries nd it optimal to
specialize in di¤erent goods even when countries are ex-ante identical
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The Ricardian Model
Alessandra Bonglioli
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October 2011
A. Bonglioli (Barcelona GSE) Class 2 October 2011 1 / 19
Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (AER, 1977)
Environment
2 countries: home and foreign (*)
1 factor of production (labor) in xed supply: L and L
continuum of goods: z 2 [0, 1]
perfect competition
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Supply Side: Technology
country-specic constant labor unit requirements: a (z) and a (z)
dene the relative technology
A (z)  a
 (z)
a (z)
for convenience, we rank the goods in order of diminishing home country
comparative advantage:
A (0) > ... > A (1)
by construction, A (z) is continuous and decreasing in z : A0 (z) < 0
perfect competition ! price(z) = marginal cost(z):
P (z) = a (z)w and P (z) = a (z)w 
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Supply Side: E¢ cient Specialization (I)
when will home produce good z?
I when a (z) < a (z) (absolute advantage): not necessarily
I when P (z) < P (z) (comparative advantage): YES!
the home country will e¢ ciently produce any good z such that
P (z)  P (z)
a (z)w  a (z)w 
m
ω  A (z)
where ω  ww  is the relative wage
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Supply Side: E¢ cient Specialization (II)
represent graphically the condition for production at home, ω  A (z)
for a given ω, the home country e¢ ciently produces goods z for which
0  z  z˜ (ω)
z˜ = A 1 (ω)
the foreign country e¢ ciently specializes in goods z˜ (ω)  z  1. Note: z˜
decreasing in ω
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Supply Side: E¢ cient Specialization (graphics)
A(z)
z10 z~
produced at
home
produced in
foreign ctry
w~
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Demand Side: Preferences
what pins down the relative wage ω? Supply=Demand
important assumptions on preferences:
1 preference are identical in both coutries
2 preferences are represented by constant expenditure shares (e.g.
Cobb-Douglas) b (z) = b (z) = b (z):
b (z) = share of income spent in good zZ 1
0
b (z) dz = 1
wLb (z) = home income spent in good zZ z˜
0
b (z) dz  ϑ (z˜) = share of income spent in home goods
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Demand Side: Trade Balance
impose Trade Balance (import = export)
wL
Z 1
z˜
b (z) dz = w L
Z z˜
0
b (z) dz
(1  ϑ (z˜))wL = ϑ (z˜)w L
rearrange it to obtain:
ω˜ =
w
w 
=
L
L
ϑ (z˜)
1  ϑ (z˜) = B

z˜ ,
L
L

! B is an upward-sloping curve in the (z ,ω) space
for a given pattern of specialization (z˜), B gives the relative wage
compatible with equilibrium in the trade balance
I z˜ " ! more goods produced in home ! " export + # import ! need
" w relative to w to rebalance trade
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Equilibrium (graphics)
A(z)
z10 z
produced at
home
produced in
foreign ctry
w
B(z, L*/L )
GFT*
GFT
A. Bonglioli (Barcelona GSE) Class 2 October 2011 9 / 19
Equilibrium
ω¯ = A (z¯)
ω¯ = B

z¯ ,
L
L

note: e¢ cient specialization ensures GFT!
per capita consumption of good z is
Autarky : cA (z) =
wb (z)
P (z)
=
b (z)
a (z)
Free   Trade : cFT (z)
( b(z )
a(z )
b(z )w
a(z )w 
for z  z¯
for z > z¯
by e¢ cient specialization, a (z)w  < a (z)w ! cFT (z) > cA (z) for
z > z¯ .
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Comparative Statics: Relative Size
suppose the rest of the world (*) gets relatively bigger (e.g. when China
and India opened to trade): L

L "
A(z)
z10 z
w
B(z, L*/L)B(z, L*/L)’
'z
'w
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Comparative Statics: Relative Size
! for given specialization pattern z¯ (jump on the B 0 curve)
homes export increase over its import ! trade surplus
relative wages rise to keep trade balance: ω "
! since labor is relatively more expensive at home (along the A curve):
home looses comparative advantage in the marginal goods
production of goods z¯ 0  z < z¯ is shifted from home to abroad
an increase in the relative size of the foreign country generates a less than
proportional rise in home relative wage
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Comparative Statics: Relative Size (welfare)
take real wages as a measure of welfare (given constant b (z)):
w
P (z)
0
=
(
1
a(z )
ω¯0
a(z )
for 0 < z  z¯ 0
for z > z¯ 0
it is easy to show that welfare is:
1 equal w.r.t. the goods that remain home-produced (0 < z  z¯ 0)
2 higher w.r.t. the goods whose production shifts abroad:
ω¯0
a (z)
  1
a (z)
> 0
for z¯ 0 < z  z¯ , by e¢ cient specialization (ω¯0  A (z))
3 higher w.r.t. the goods that were already foreign-produced:
ω¯0
a(z ) >
ω¯
a(z ) for z > z¯
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Comparative Statics: Uniform Technical Progress
(graphics)
suppose the foreign country becomes uniformly more productive: a (z) #
for every z .
A(z)
z10 'z
'w
B(z, L*/L )
A(z)’
w
z
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Comparative Statics: Uniform Technical Progress
a (z) # for every z .
! parallel downward shift of A (z)
! industries z¯ 0 < z < z¯ move abroad (home loses comparative
advantage)
! home labor demand # ! ω¯ # (proportionately less than A)
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Comparative Statics: Uniform Technical Progress (welfare)
again, take real wages as a measure of welfare
1 w.r.t. goods z  z¯ 0, no loss, no gain:
w
P (z)
0
=
w
P (z)
=
1
a (z)
2 w.r.t. goods z¯ 0 < z < z¯ , gains:
w
P (z)
0
  w
P (z)
= ω¯0
1
a (z)0
  1
a (z)
> 0
since, by e¢ cient specialization, good z has to be cheaper abroad:
a(z )0
a(z ) < ω¯
0
3 w.r.t. goods z  z¯ , gains > losses:
w
P (z)
0
  w
P (z)
= ω¯0
1
a (z)0
  ω¯ 1
a (z)
since ω¯0 < ω¯ and a (z)0 < a (z), but ω # less than a (z).
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Comparative Statics: Technology Catch-up (Samuelson,
2004)
assume
I North (home) has absolute advantage: a (z) > a (z) for all z 2 [0, 1]
I complete technological catch-up: a (z)0 = a (z) for all z 2 [0, 1]
world production is maximized
benet for the South
North (home) gets back to autarky
losses for the North (home)
note: same result with perfect labor mobility ! L migrates to the
North
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The Volume of Trade
denote Y = wL and Y  = w L (GDP)
since θ (z¯) is the share of world income spent on domestic product,
we must have:
Y = θ (z¯) (Y  + Y )
income = expenditure
volume of trade (VT )
VT = 2Y θ (z¯) =
2Y Y
Y  + Y
NOTE: trade increases in country size
trade volume of any country pair as a ratio of total GDP
(VT/GDPW ) is maximized when the 2 countries have the same GDP
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Ricardian Model: Summary
countries trade to exploit technological di¤erences
all countries benet from trade
smaller countries benet most from trade: specialize in fewer goods
! higher average productivity
productivity growth in one country (generally) benets both countries
through trade
technological catch-up of the South erodes the gains from trade of
the North (also South ! North immigration does so)
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International Trade - Class 3-4
The Heckscher-Ohlin Model
Alessandra Bonglioli
Instituto de Análisis Económico
Barcelona GSE
November 2011
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The Heckscher-Ohlin Model
Recall the law of comparative advantage: countries trade when
autarky relative prices are di¤erent from free trade prices
In the Ricardian model, comparative advantage arises from di¤erences
in technology
Variation in autarky prices - ie, comparative advantage - may arise
from di¤erences in factor endowments (capital, labor, skilled labor...)
This possibility is explored in the Heckscher-Ohlin model
Two main di¤erences relative to the Ricardian model:
1 technology is identical in all countries
2 there are two (possibly more) factors, capital (K ) and labor (L) - and
two (possibly more) goods, X and Y
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The Heckscher-Ohlin Model: Assumptions
1 production functions exhibit constant returns to scale
2 production functions for X and Y di¤er in the relative usage of
capital and labor:
- good X is labor intensive
- good Y is capital intensive
3 factors (K and L) are:
- in xed supply
- perfectly mobile between industries within each country
- immobile between countries
4 all markets are competitive, no distortions
5 preferences are identical across countries and homogeneous: bx =
income share spent on X
6 countries di¤er in relative endowments
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Relative Endowments (K/L) across countries
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Technology and Factor Intensity
for simplicity, assume a xed-coe¢ cients technology:
kx = capital needed to produce 1 unit of X
lx = labor needed to produce 1 unit of X
ky = capital needed to produce 1 unit of Y
ly = labor needed to produce 1 unit of Y
ki and li are unit factor demand. In general, they should depend on
factor prices
w = wage, r = rental rate of capital
but we disregard this (for now). We assume they are exogenous.
goods di¤er in factor intensity:
ky
ly
>
kx
lx
good Y always uses a higher capital-labor ratio than good X
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Factor Intensity: Examples
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Autarky Equilibrium
perfect competition ! price = marginal cost = unit cost (CRS):
px = kx r + lxw
py = ky r + lyw
factor market clearing:
K = Xkx + Yky
L = Xlx + Yly
product market clearing:
p =
px
py
=
bx
1  bx 
Y
X
choose a numeraire (py or px ) by Walras law
! 5 equations, 5 unknowns (p, r , w , X , Y )
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Autarky Equilibrium: Production
derive production by solving the factor market clearing conditions:
K = Xkx + Yky and L = Xlx + Yly
! Y = Klx   Lkx
ky lx   kx ly ; X =
Lky  Kly
ky lx   kx ly
the assumption that Y is capital-intensive implies that the
denominator is positive:
ky lx   kx ly > 0, ky/ly > kx/lx
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Autarky Equilibrium: Production (contd)
we assume that the numerators are positive:
Lky  Kly > 0! ky/ly > K/L
Klx   Lkx > 0! K/L > kx/lx
! ky
ly
>
K
L
>
kx
lx
! for both goods to be produced, the total K/L ratio must be within
the factor intensity of the two industries (cone of diversication)
NOTE: if the numerator is non-positive there is a corner solution !
specialization (the country only produces 1 good)
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The Cone of Diversication
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The Cone of Diversication
Cone of diversication = area between the ky/ly and kx/lx lines
Endowment (L,K ) lies in the cone and allows for diversied production:
DY and DX are the (L,K ) used to produce Y and X
Endowment (L0,K 0) lies outside the cone (too much labor). Only the
L-intensive good can be produced (SX ), and there is no full employment
Endowment (L00,K 00) lies outside the cone (too much capital). Only the
K -intensive good can be produced (SY ), and there is no full employment
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Autarky Equilibrium: Prices
derive relative prices by substituting production
Y =
Klx   Lkx
ky lx   kx ly ; X =
Lky  Kly
ky lx   kx ly
into product market clearing:
p =
px
py
=
bx
1  bx 
Y
X
=
bx
1  bx 
Klx   Lkx
Lky  Kly
p =
bx
1  bx 
K
L lx   kx
ky   KL ly
= p

K
L

countries with di¤erent relative endowments have di¤erent prices:
- in K-abundant countries, the K-intensive good is relatively cheap
- in L-abundant countries, the L-intensive good is relatively cheap
intuition: high K ! high Y ! low py
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The Integrated Economy
consider now trade between 2 countries: home, h, and foreign, f ,
with h relatively capital abundant: K
h
Lh >
K f
Lf
Q.: How are goods and factor prices, and production determined?
A.: Consider the world as an Integrated Economy and nd its autarky
equilibrium
perfect competition ! price = marginal cost = unit cost (CRS):
pIEx = kx r
IE + lxw IE
pIEy = ky r
IE + lyw IE
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The Integrated Economy (contd)
factor market clearing:
K IE = X IE kx + Y IE ky
LIE = X IE lx + Y IE ly
NOTE: this condition imposes factor mobility, but we assumed
immobile factors. (well reconcile this)
product market clearing:
pIE =
pIEx
pIEy
=
bx
1  bx 
Y IE
X IE
with K IE  K h +K f , LIE  Lh + Lf , Y IE  Y h + Y f
X IE  X h + X f
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Factor Price Equalization Theorem
compare the integrated equilibrium to the free-trade equilibrium (where
factors are immobile):
by creating a single market for goods, free trade equalizes px and py
everywhere.
under some conditions, free trade is enough to equalize factor prices,
w and r , (FT equivalent to IE, even though factors are not mobile).
Theorem
FPE Theorem: free trade will equalize relative factor prices through the
equalization of relative commodity prices, so long as all countries produce
both goods
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Factor Price Equalization Theorem (Proof)
Proof.
no specialization ! both goods are produced everywhere and sold at the
same price (price = marginal cost)
pIEx = kx r + lxw
pIEy = ky r + lyw
unique solution to the autonomous system of 2 eq. in 2 unknowns ! all
countries will have the same w and r , because technology (kx , lx , ky , ly ) is
assumed to be identical.
NOTE: if one country is fully specialized, this collapses to 1 eq. in 2
unknowns ! no FPE
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IE Equilibrium: Graphical Analysis
Given endowments and factor intensities of countries h and f , check if the
FPE Theorem holds: K
c
Lc 2
h
kx
lx
,
ky
ly
i
for c = h, f
1 if not, the IE does not dene the equilibrium: nd it in another (more
complicated) way
2 if so, easily nd production and consumption patterns in both
countries ! also trade!
this can be analyzed graphically by drawing the IE equilibrium in the
Edgeworth box.
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IE Equilibrium: the Edgeworth Box
E
C
0h
0f
Xh
Yh
YfXf
LIE
LIE
KIE
KIE
cxh
cyh
ky/ ly
kx/ lx
w/ r
Kh
Lh
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IE Equilibrium: the Edgeworth Box
0h, 0f = origin for country h and f
Red area = Diversication set = intersection of the diversication cones of
h and f
E = endowment (Lh,K h) and (Lf = LIE   Lh,K f = K IE  K h)
(X h,Y h) = production basket of country h lies on the relative factor
intesity lines (slope kxll and
ky
ly
) through E
C = consumption basket (C hx ,C
h
y ), lies on the relative factor price line
through E
EC = factor content of trade
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Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem
the equilibrium prices in the Integrated Economy determine the pattern of
trade
Theorem
H-O Theorem: a country will export the commodity that uses intensively
its relatively abundant factor
Proof.
derive prices under free trade as the integrated economy prices:
pIE =
bx
1  bx 
K IE
LIE lx   kx
ky   K IELIE ly
,
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Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem
Proof.
compare pIE to h and f autarky prices:
ph =
bx
1  bx 
K h
Lh lx   kx
ky   K hLh ly
; pf =
bx
1  bx 
K f
Lf lx   kx
ky   K fLf ly
from K
h
Lh >
K f
Lf it is shown that
ph > pIE > pf
the conclusion follows from the Law of Comparative Advantage (in
this case, h exports the K -intensive good Y ).
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Heckscher-Ohlin: the GFT
consider relative prices in autarky ph,A and free trade pFT < ph,A
Y
X
ph
pIE
XcFT
YcFT
A
UAU
FT
Xp
Yp
NOTE: unit factor demand is constant ! PPF is a rectangle, determined
by endowments ! GFT only from exchange. No gains from specialization.
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Stolper Samuelson Theorem
Theorem
Stolper Samuelson Theorem: a relative increase in the price of a
commodity will increase the real return to the factor used intensively in
that industry and reduce the real return to the other factor
Proof.
solve the pricing conditions, px = kx r + lxw and py = ky r + lyw ,to get
r =
lxpy   lypx
ky lx   kx ly , and w =
kypx   kxpy
ky lx   kx ly
! r is increasing in py and decreasing in px
! w is increasing in px and decreasing in py
Moreover, it can be shown that, if ∆py > 0 and ∆px = 0:
%∆r > %∆py > 0 > %∆w (magnication e¤ect)
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Winners and Losers from Trade
in the Heckscher-Ohlin model, trade has strong redistributional e¤ects
while a country on average benets from trade (GFT theorem), one
factor gains while the other is worse-o¤ relative to autarky
to see this, recall:
ph > pIE > pf
a move to free trade increases the relative price of the good produced
with the abundant factor
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem immediately implies:w
r
h
>
w
r
IE
>
w
r
f
! trade helps the relatively abundant factor, harms the scarce one!
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Rybczynski Theorem
Theorem
Rybczynski Theorem: for given commodity prices, an increase in the
supply of a factor will lead to an increase in the output of the commodity
using that factor intensively and a decrease in the output of the other
commodity
Proof.
solve the market clearing conditions
K = Xkx + Yky and L = Xlx + Yly
to get
Y =
Klx   Lkx
ky lx   kx ly ; X =
Lky  Kly
ky lx   kx ly
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Rybczynski Theorem (contd)
Proof.
Y =
Klx   Lkx
ky lx   kx ly ; X =
Lky  Kly
ky lx   kx ly
X increasing in L and decreasing in K
Y decreasing in K and increasing in L
Moreover, it can be shown that, if ∆L > 0 and ∆K = 0:
%∆X > %∆L > 0 > %∆Y (magnication e¤ect)
NOTE: this implies strong reallocations towards the sector that is intensive
in the factor whose endowment increases!
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Generalization: Endogenous Techniques
where do kx , lx , ky , ly come from?
in general, the capital/labor ratio is chosen in each sector in order to
minimize costs
denote by ci (w , r) the unit cost function in sector i 2 fX ,Y g
ci (w , r) = min
ki ,li
fwli + rki j Fi (li , ki ) = 1g
where Fi (li , ki ) is the production function in sector i .
NOTE: the unit cost functions ci (w , r) are identical for all countries
since Fi () are identical
it can be shown that the unit factor demand satises:
ki (w , r) =
∂ci (w , r)
∂r
; li (w , r) =
∂ci (w , r)
∂w
;
NOTE: the coe¢ cients that we assumed as xed now depend on
factor prices, w and r , yet they are equal across countries
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Endogenous Techniques: Implications (graphics)
P
Y
X
ph
pIE
XcFT
YcFT
Xp
Yp A C
UA
UFT
YpFT
XpFT
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Endogenous Techniques: Implications
production in the two sector depends not only on endowments, but also on
prices
the PPF now has a smooth curvature:
! a change in p increases production of the good that becomes more
expensive
! trade promotes specialization: it increases production in the sector that
uses intensively the abundant factor (the export sector).
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Generalization II: many goods and factors
Heckscher-Ohlin theorem does not generalize easily to the case of many
goods and factors
with many factors, ranking factor intensity may be problematic
suppose we add natural resources R and we get:
ky
ly
>
kx
lx
and
ky
ry
<
kx
rx
which good is capital intensive?
with many goods, the pattern of trade may be undetermined, even if
factors are 2
the H-O Theorem generalizes to many goods, factors and
countries when we consider the trade in factors embedded in the
trade of goods, ie the factor content of trade
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Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek Theorem
assume we have N factors, M goods (with M  N) and any number
C of countries
assume FPE and identical homothetic preferences
dene sc as country c fraction of world consumption (=income)
denote V ci and V
w
i the endowments of factor i for country c and the
world w
countries consumeworld endowments proportionally to their
relative income, hence
scV wi = factor i embedded in cs consumption
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Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek Theorem
the net content of factor i in county c exports is:
F ci = V
c
i   scV wi
i.e. (cs endowment of factor i)   (factor i content of cs
consumption)
Theorem
HOV Theorem: a country is a net exporter (F ci > 0) of the services of
relatively abundant factors (V ci > s
cV wi ) and a net importer (F
c
i < 0) of
the services of relatively scarce factors (V ci < s
cV wi )
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Some Empirical Tests of the Heckscher-Ohlin Model
Treer (AER, 1995) uses data from 1983 for 33 countries (76/79%
world exp/import) and 9 factors two compute both sides of
F ci = V
c
i   scV wi
to compute F ci , the net factor content (NFC) of trade, he uses data
on trade in goods plus the input-output table of the US economy to
convert goods into their embedded factors
(F c1 , ...,F
c
N )
0 = AT c
where A is the (N M) matrix of factor intensities and T c the vector
of net commodity exports (M = 79)
data are available for factor endowments V ci and V
w
i
consumption shares are computed as sc = GNP
c TradeBalancec
∑
c
GNP c
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Treer (AER, 1995)
correlation test:
Corr(F ci ,V
c
i   scV wi ) = 0.28
pretty weak...
SIGN TEST: how many times does the sign of F ci (actual NFC)
matches the sign of V ci   scV wi (predicted NFC)?
49.8%! as good as tossing a coin!
similar result was found by Bowen, Leamer and Sveikauskas (1987)
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Treer (AER, 1995): The Case of Missing Trade
under HOV, the ratio between actual and predicted NFC of trade is:
F ci
V ci   scV wi
= 1
in the data it is:
F ci
V ci   scV wi
' 0
actual NFC of trade is much less that what is predicted by factor
endowments ! Some trade is missing!
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Explaining the Failures
the previous tests are valid under the assumptions (among others)
that:
1 all countries use the same technology (false)
2 factor prices are equalized everywhere (false)
3 data on endowments are fully comparable (false)
thus, these tests have limited power
A. Bonglioli (Barcelona GSE) Class 3-4 November 2011 36 / 42
More Successful Tests of the HO Model
Romalis (2004) tests a quasi-HO prediction:
countries that are abundant in skilled labor and capital capture larger
shares of US imports in industries that use intensively those factors
this prediction is obtained in absence of FPE
test using data on US imports from many countries and across
industries, and country factor endowments
main advantage: US imports data are high quality!
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Romalis (AER 2004): industry factor intensities
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Romalis (AER 2004): US Imports from North vs South in
1998
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Romalis (AER 2004): Equation
Xcj = αc + (β1 + β2skillc ) zj + (β3 + β4capitalc ) kj
+ (β5 + β6rawc )mj + εcj
Xcj = country c share of US import in industry j
zj , kj ,mj = skill, capital, raw material intensity in industry j
skillc , capitalc , rawc = country c endowment of human capital, physical
capital, raw materials
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Romalis (AER 2004): Estimates
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H-O Model: Summary
countries trade due to comparative advantage
comparative advantage derives by di¤erent relative factor endowments 
e.g. KL

FPE: under certain conditions, trade in goods also equalizes factor
prices
Stolper-Samuelson: trade redistributes resources towards the
relatively abundant factor
Rybczynski: countries produce relatively more of the good intensive
in the relatively abundant factor
HO/HOV Theorem: a country exports the good intensive in the
relatively abundant factor/ its services
empirical tests of HOV: early failures (e.g. Treer, 1995), late success
(Romalis, 2004)
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Beyond Comparative Advantage
The Ricardian and the HO model are models of Comparative
Advantage (CA)
CA models can explain
1 trade between dissimilar countries (by technology/endowments)
2 inter-industry trade (export in one industry, import in another)
yet, trade takes place mostly between similar countries:
recall, North-North + South-South trade ' 67% of world trade
about 60% of trade is intra-industry-trade:
countries simultaneously export and import within the same industry
we need a new model to understand why similar countries trade with
each other similar goods
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Intra-Industry Trade: Data
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Intra-Industry Trade: Data
The Intra-Industry Trade index is computed as
IIT Index = 1  jej   ij j
ej + ij
where j = industry, e = export, i = import
NOTE: IIT prevails in sectors producing di¤erentiated goods!
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Intra-Industry Trade: Data
Shares of German Trade
NOTE: IIT (horizontal and vertical) prevails among developed countries
and with NIE. Trade di¤erent goods with LDCs
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NewTrade Theory: IRS and Product Di¤erentiation
Suppose that, within industry, goods are di¤erentiated :
eg, a Wolkswagen is not a perfect substitute for a Renault
Suppose there are increasing returns to scale (IRS): it is cheaper to
produce in one plant in one location, rather than using two plants in
two locations
Wolkswagen will be produced in one country (Germany), Renault
possibly in another (France)
Some consumers prefer Wolkswagen, others prefer Renault
Some Wolkswagen will be sold in France and some Renault in
Germany
In the 1980s, new trade models were developed to explore this
mechanism
A. Bonglioli (Barcelona GSE) Class 5-6 November 2011 6 / 39
Krugman (AER, 1980): Scale Economies, Product
Di¤erentiation and IIT
technical di¢ culty: with IRS perfect competition must be abandoned
to minimize the departure from perfect competition, we use the
notion of monopolistic competition. Main features:
1 rms produce di¤erentiated goods (one rm, one variety)
2 each rm has market power on its own variety (p 6= MC )
3 there is a large number of rms ! no single rm is big enough to
a¤ect industry output and the behavior of other rms (no strategic
interaction).
4 free entry: prots are driven to zero
NOTE: rms are atomistic, but have market power because each
produces a di¤erentiated good
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Preferences
Consumers derive utility from consuming n goods:
U =
Z n
0
c (i)
σ 1
σ
 σ
σ 1
di , 1 < σ < ∞
n = number of "varieties" i ; ci quantity consumed of each variety
IMPORTANT PROPERTY: love of variety
suppose ci = c and pi = p 8i
consider E disposable income: E = npc
then, substitute c = Enp into U:
U = n
σ
σ 1

E
np

= n
1
σ

E
p

! "love of variety": for a given spending, welfare increases with n
(as long as σ < ∞)
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Demand Functions
Consumers choose ci to maximize utility, subject to a budget
constraint:
max
ci
U =
Z n
0
c (i)
σ 1
σ
 σ
σ 1
di
s.t. E =
Z n
0
p (i) c (i) di
where disposable income is E .
Lagrangean and rst order conditions (trick: maximize U
σ 1
σ ):
L =
Z n
0
c (i)
σ 1
σ di + λ

E  
Z n
0
p (i) c (i) di

∂L
∂c (i)
= 0! σ  1
σ
c (i) 
1
σ = λp (i)
where λ (the Lagrange multiplier) is the shadow price on the budget
constraint (the marginal utility of income)
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Demand Functions (contd)
For any pair of varieties i and j , the f.o.c. deliver the relative demand
c (i)
c (j)
=

p (i)
p (j)
 σ
elasticity of substitutions between varieties:
ei ,j =
%∆ c (i )c (j)
%∆ p(i )p(j)
=  
d log c (i )c (j)
d log p(i )p(j)
= σ
NOTE: for σ! 1 utility tends to a Cobb-Douglas
for σ! ∞ utility gets linear, i.e. varieties are perfect
substitutes
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Demand Functions (contd)
Re-write the relative demand as
p (j)
c (j)
c (i)
= p (j)1 σ p (i)σ
and intergate by jZ n
0
p (j) c (j)
c (i)
dj =
Z n
0
p (j)1 σ p (i)σ dj
E
c (i)
= p (i)σ
Z n
0
p (j)1 σ dj
c (i) = p (i) σ
ER n
0 p (j)
1 σ dj
c (i) =

P
p (i)
σ E
P
with P =
hR n
0 p (j)
1 σ dj
i 1
1 σ
is the price index (= minimum cost of
one unit of utility).
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Demand Functions (contd)
price elasticity of demand
ei =
%∆c (i)
%∆p (i)
=  d log c (i)
d log p (i)
= σ
Market clearing: aggregate production, x (i), must equal aggregate
demand, i.e. the sum of individual demand over the L population
x (i) = Lc (i) =

P
p (i)
σ EL
P
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Firms: Costs
each rm must pay:
1 a xed cost of F units of labor (to build a plant or to design a new
product) plus
2 a constant marginal cost of β units of labor per unit of output
thus, the total cost function is:
TCi = (F + βxi )w
average cost,
AC =
TCi
xi
=

F
xi
+ β

w ,
is decreasing in production ! IRS
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Firms: Prot Maximization (monopolistic competition)
rm i sets pi in order to maximize prots,
pii = pixi   (βxi + F )w
given the demand xi = x (i) =

P
pi
σ
EL
P .
thus:
max
pi
pii = (pi   βw)

P
pi
σ EL
P
  Fw
∂pii
∂pi
= 0! pi =

1  1
σ
 1
βw = p
NOTE: rms charge a mark-up
 
σ
σ 1

over marginal cost, since
agents want to consume each and every good at any cost.
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Firms: Prot Maximization (monopolistic competition)
the scale of production is the same for all rms/varieties:
xi = x = p σELPσ 1.
prots per rm:
pii = (pi   βw) xi   Fw = 1
(σ  1)βwx   Fw
NOTE: all rms charge the same price, produce the same amount and
make the same prots: pi = p, xi = x , pii = pi.
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Free Entry
the number of rms n increases until prots are driven to zero
imposing zero-prot,
1
(σ  1)βwx   Fw = 0,
we can solve for rm size:
x =
(σ  1) F
β
to nd n, we use x and labor market clearing:
L = n (βx + F )
! n = L
σF
SCALE EFFECTS: the number of rms (goods) is proportional to the
labor force ! larger economies produce more goods and have higher
welfare
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Open Economy
Suppose the world consists of two countries, h and f , identical in all
respects but population size: Lh, Lf
Assume free trade in goods
Given constant mark-up pricing and free-entry, for every good i
production will be x = (σ 1)Fβ
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Open Economy (contd)
Firm size x is identical ! p must be identical ! wh = wf ! FPE
holds (this may not hold, e.g. if there are trade costs)
since labor is not mobile, labor market must clear in each country.
This determines the number of varieties that each country produces
nh =
Lh
σF
; nf =
Lf
σF
NOTE: by love of variety, in both countries all nh + nf are consumed
E¤ect of trade: increase in the number of goods, no change in
quantities produced by each rm.
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Open Economy: the GFT
Utility in country k 2 fh, f g under free trade (UFTk ) is higher than in
autarky (UAk ):
UFTk
 σ 1
σ
=
Z nh+nf
0

xi
Lh + Lf
 σ 1
σ
di
=
(Lh + Lf )
1
σ
σF

(σ  1) F
β
 σ 1
σ

UFTk
UAk
 σ 1σ
=

Lh + Lf
Lk
 1
σ
> 1 for σ < ∞
σ < ∞ consumers love variety ! new source of GFT
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Open Economy: Reconsidering GFT
1 At rm level: trade has no e¤ects on rm size
x =
(σ  1) F
β
= Constant
2 Trade has no impact on competition (mark-up only depends on σ)
3 At aggregate level: trade ! each variety is produced in one country
(by IRS) ! " the number of varieties that can be consumed
! GFT only come from "love of variety" (not from IRS at rm level)
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Open Economy: Reconsidering GFT (II)
Krugman (1979) allows for pro-competitive GFT
Assume the elasticity of substitution to increase with the number of
varieties
σ = σ(n)
+
Trade ! more varieties ! mark-up ( σσ 1 ) # ! rm size " (exploit
IRS)
GFT due to:
I increased varieties (though n less than proportional to L)
I e¢ ciency: x " ! AC # ! C " (pro-competitive GFT)
There are models without love of variety where only pro-competitive
GFT occur
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The Volume of Trade
assume for convenience that F = 1σ , so that n = L
consumers in h import the nf goods produced in f , and viceversa
volume of trade = export of h + export of f :
VT = Lh  nf  p xLh + Lf| {z }
export f
+ Lf  nh  p xLh + Lf| {z }
export h
= 2
LhLf
Lh + Lf
 px = 2sh (1  sh)  px (Lh + Lf )
with sh =
Lh
Lh+Lf
country h share in world GDP (or relative size).
note: trade increases with the size of countries (recall class 2)
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Trade and Similarity
trade/world GDP
VT
GDPW
= 2sh (1  sh)
what is country h relative size sh that maximizes trade?
sh =
1
2
! Lh = Lf
trade is maximized when the two countries have the same size. Trade
is higher, the more similar the size of the countries.
this generalizes to more than 2 countries (see Helpman, 1987)
VTK
K
∑
i=1
GDPi
=
K
∑
i=1
GDPi
GDPW
"
1 
K
∑
i=1
s2i
#
.
with si =
GDPi
K
∑
k=1
GDPk
.The term 1  K∑
i=1
s2i is referred to as index of
similarity (it is higher the more similar the countries).
empirical test in Helpman (1987): the relationship holds qualitatively
(positive correlation between trade and similarity) for 14 industrialized
countries during 1956-1981
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Trade and Similarity: Graphical Evidence
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The Gravity Equation
both in the Ricardian model (recall, class 2) and in models with IRS
and monopolistic competition, the volume of trade between i and j
can be derived as a function of their GDP (Yi , Yj ) and of trade
barriers related to distance (Dij ), :
Tij = B0Y
β1
i Y
β2
j D
β3
ij .
this is often referred to as the Gravity Equation of trade
the log of this equation can be easily estimated with OLS:
lnTij = β0 + β1 lnYi + β2 lnYj + β3 lnDij + uij
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An Application of the GE: Trade and Similarity
Hummels and Levinson (1995) estimate the following version of the
Gravity Equation:
ln

VT ijt

= α1 ln

Y ijt  Similarityijt

+ νij + εijt ,
Y ijt = Y
i
t + Y
j
t
Similarityijt = 1 
 
s it
2   s jt2
νij = µij + Y
ij/YW (note: assume i and j make a constant share of
world GDP)
they nd that the GE explains (even too) well trade:
I α1 > 0 and signicant, with R2  0.98 for i , j among 14 OECD
countries in 1962-1983 (consistent with Krugman)
I α1 > 0 and signicant, with R2  0.67 for i , j among 14 non-OECD
countries in 1962-1983 (not consistent with Krugman)
puzzle: if we take this as a test, it looks like a failure of IRS and
monopolitic competition models
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Trade and Similarity: Another Test
Debaere (2005) considers bilateral trade between 101 OECD and
Non-OECD countries in 1970-1992 and estimates:
ln
 
VT ijt
GDP ijt
!
= β ln

Similarityijt

+ γ ln

Y ijt /Y
W
t

+ ηij + εijt ,
Note:
1 Y ijt is on the LHS for multiplying it by Similarity
ij
t necessarily generates
a positive β due to Cov(VT ijt ,Y
ij
t )>0
2 Y ij/YW is let vary over time
Test of Helpman (1987):
1 β  1 (>0) for i , j 2 OECD
2 β  0 for i , j /2 OECD
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Debaere (JIE, 2005)
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Debaere (JIE, 2005)
in sum:
similarity matters for trade among OECD countries (where IIT is
prevalent), not for trade among non-OECD countries: consistent with
New Trade Theory
relative size of country pairs matters for trade in general: consistent
with many models of trade (NTT, Ricardian model,...)
A. Bonglioli (Barcelona GSE) Class 5-6 November 2011 29 / 39
Other applications: McCallum (1995)
intra-national (Canada-Canada and US-US) vs Inter-national
(Canada-US) trade
estimate the following gravity equation:
lnEXP ji = β0 + β1 lnGDP
i + β2 lnGDP
j + γINTRAij + ρ ln d ij + εij
with d ij = distance, INTRAij = 1 if i , j 2 CAN
results:
1 β1 and β2 close to 1: export increase with the size of both the origin
and the destination country (province/state)
2 γ is huge: intranational trade 16-22 times bigger than international!!!
is the Border E¤ect so BIG?
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Border E¤ect
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Border E¤ect
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) argue that borders have an asymmetric
e¤ect depending on country size: larger in smaller countries
assume GDP
US
GDPCAN  10!under frinctionless trade and specialization, canadian export to US
EXPUS ,CAN
GDPCAN = 0.9 and intranational trade in CAN 1  EXP
US ,CAN
GDPCAN = 0.1
assume border e¤ect reduces cross border trade by 50%
! EXPUS ,CANGDPCAN = 0.45 and CAN internal trade 0.55 ! cross-border
trade # by 50%, cross-province trade " by 550% ! internal/cross
border trade " by 1100%!
EXPCAN ,US
GDPUS from 0.1 to 0.05 and US internal trade from 0.9 to 0.95 !
cross-border trade # by 50%, cross-state trade " by 5.5 % !
internal/cross border trade " by slightly more than 200%.
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Border E¤ect in the Gravity Model
how to get unbiased estimates of the border e¤ect?
1 estimate
ln
EXP ji
GDP iGDP j
= β0 + γBORDER
ij + ρ ln d ij + εij
with BORDER ij = 1 if i 2 CAN and j 2 US (or viceversa)
2 compute the border e¤ect considering that P
i
P z and
P j
P z may a¤ect
trade and change with trade barriers
after accounting properly for that, US-CAN trade barriers:
US-CAN trade # 41%
US-US trade " 5%
CAN-CAN trade " 430%
! CAN Border e¤ect = 10.5 times
US Border e¤ect = 2.6 times
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Gravity Equations and Border E¤ect: Do it Yourself
Robert Feenstra provides data and Stata do-les to replicate the
estimations of the gravity equation for US states and Canadian
provinces.
I download the le Chapter-5.zip from the intranet
I open Empirical_Exercise_Ch5.doc and follow the instructions
I enjoy!
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Empirical evidence: Gains from increased variety
Broda and Weinstein (2006):
I varieties imported in the US (1972-2001) rose from 75,000 to 260,000
I compute a variety-adjusted unit price of import:
I 1972-2001:
P Padj
P = 1.2% per year
I overall welfare gain = 2.6% of real GDP!
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Imported varieties 1972-1988
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Imported varieties 1990-2001
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Summary (Theory)
Intra-Industry Trade among similar countries accounts for 60% of
world trade
comparative advantage cannot explain this pattern
IRS + "Love of Variety": yes, we can!
similar countries specialize in di¤erent varieties
size e¤ect: larger countries produce more varieties
trade grows with similarity (is maximized among countries with equal
size)
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Summary (Empirics)
gravity equation: bilateral trade grows with country size and
decreases with trade barriers
I application 1: test NTT
theory holds: similarity explains trade among OECD, not among
non-OECD (CA holds for them)
I application 2: border e¤ect
quantifying the gains from increased varieties: they are large!
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Firm Heterogeneity
in the model with IRS and love of variety, all rms are identical and
all of them export
in reality:
I exporters are a minority
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Firm Heterogeneity (II)
I exporters di¤er dramatically from Non-Exporters
A. Bonglioli (Barcelona GSE) Class 7-8 November 2011 3 / 35
Labor Productivity and Export Status across US Firms
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Firm Heterogeneity (III)
larger rms export more
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Firm Heterogeneity: A Model
Melitz (2003) modies the previous model to account for these facts:
I not all rms export
I exporters are bigger and more productive than Non-Exporters
I larger exporters export more
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Melitz (2003): Demand
assume love of variety (Dixit-Stiglitz preferences)
U =
C
L
=
1
L
Z M
0
c (i)
σ 1
σ di
 σσ 1
, 1 < σ < ∞
we will assume the number of varieties (rms) M is exogenous.
demand for variety i will be
y (i) =

p (i)
P
 σ E
P
with E = PC total expenditure and P the price index
P =
Z M
0
p (i)1 σ di
 1
1 σ
A. Bonglioli (Barcelona GSE) Class 7-8 November 2011 7 / 35
Firm Heterogeneity: Closed Economy
suppose that rms di¤er (exogenously) in productivity ϕ
rms face variable and xed labor costs:
TC (i) = TC (ϕ) =
y (ϕ)
ϕ
+ fD
where fD = xed cost of production (serving the domestic market)
and wage is the numeraire (w = 1)
rms are monopolistically competitive ! set price
p (ϕ) =
σ
(σ  1) ϕ
prot per rm with productivity ϕ is
pi (ϕ) =
E
σ

P
(σ  1) ϕ
σ
σ 1
  fD
! more productive rms: charge lower prices, sell more, make
higher prots
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Producing and Non-Producing Firms
given prots,
piD = Z ϕ
σ 1   fD
with Z = Eσ
h
P (σ 1)σ
iσ 1
, rms can shut down at no cost, hence:
I if pi  0 stay, otherwise exit
I only the most productive rms (ϕ > ϕD ) survive (the others cannot
cover the xed cost)
the number of varieties M corresponds to the number of surviving
rms
note: there can be positive prots because entry takes place before
knowing ϕ and entrants break even in expectation
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Producing and Non-Producing Firms (graph)
0
js-1(jD*)s-1
p
-fD
pD(j s-1)
exit
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Welfare
take real wage as a measure of welfare:
W =
w
P
=
1
P
the price index is a function of the number of varieties, M, and
average productivity, ϕ:
P =
Z M
0
p (i)1 σ di
 1
1 σ
= M
1
1 σ
σ
σ  1
"R M
0 ϕ (i)
σ 1 di
M
# 1
1 σ
= M
1
1 σ
σ
(σ  1)
1
ϕ
=) welfare is increasing in the number of varieties (l.o.v.) and average
productivity
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Exporting and Non-Exporting Firms I
suppose now that a rm can sell into a foreign market (X )
assume countries are symmetric (same size, technology and
preferences) ! Z = ZX
to serve a foreign market, there are two additional costs:
1 a new xed cost (distribution and servicing costs) fX
2 an iceberg cost τ > 1: ship τ to deliver 1
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Exporting and Non-Exporting Firms II
price of exported goods
pX = τ
σ
(σ  1) ϕ
prots from export:
piX = τ
1 σZ ϕσ 1   fX
assume τσ 1fX > fD
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Exporting and Non-Exporting Firms III (graph)
0
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p
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jX*
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pD(j s-1)
-fX
exit
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Exporting and Non-Exporting Firms III
piD = Z ϕ
σ 1   fD and piX = τ1 σZ ϕσ 1   fX
! rms with productivity below ϕD exit
! rms between ϕD and ϕX produce in the domestic market only
! rms above ϕX export too
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Trade and Selection
only the most productive rms export
what happens if the costs of export (τ and/or fX ) fall?
prots from exporting piX = τ1 σZ ϕσ 1   fX increase
! more rms decide to export (ϕX falls)
rms that do not export lose domestic sales due to foreign
competition (P # since foreign competitors more productive ! Z #)
! the least productive rms are forced to exit (ϕD increases)
the survival of the best t: trade forces the least productive rms out
of the market thereby raising average productivity
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Trade and Welfare
recall:
W =
σ  1
σ
ϕMσ 1t
to evaluate welfare, look at:
1 number of consumed varieties Mt = M +MX :
I exit of domestic rms ! M #
I entry of foreign new exporters ! MX "
2 average productivity ϕ:
I exiting domestic rms are replaced by more productive foreign
exporters ! ϕ "
Result: trade is welfare improving always (proof in Melitz 2003)
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Heterogeneous Firms, FDI and Multinationals
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (AER, 2004) generalize Melitz (2003)
model by adding multinational rms
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is the investment to open a plant in
a foreign country
to allow for this possibility, assume that opening a foreign plant
requires a xed cost fI > fX
prots from FDI:
piI = Z ϕ
σ 1   fI
proximity vs concentration trade-o¤: multinationals face higher xed
costs, but save on the transportation cost
a rm chooses FDI rather than exporting when piI > piX
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Multinationals, Exporting and Non-Exporting Firms
piD = Z ϕ
σ 1  fD piX = τ1 σZ ϕσ 1  fX piI = Z ϕσ 1  fI
! rms with productivity below ϕD exit
! rms between ϕD and ϕX produce in the domestic market only
! rms above ϕX export too
! rms above ϕI become multinationals
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Multinationals, Exporting and Non-Exporting Firms
0
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Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (AER, 2004): Empirics
multinationals tend to be more productive than other rms, as the
model predicts
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Export vs FDI: Theory Predicts
the model also predicts that FDI prevails over IIT as:
trade costs increase
plant-level xed costs fall
sectoral heterogeneity in productivity increases
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Export vs FDI: Data
use 1994 US data on exports and FDI sales for:
I 52 manufacturing sectors
I 27 (up to 38) destination countries
unit costs of exporting (τ) = FREIGHT and TARIFF
xed costs of exporting (fX ) = country xed e¤ect
xed costs of investment abroad (fI ) = country xed e¤ect +
sector-average plant-level xed cost (FP)
dispersion of productivity within sectors = sd(log(sales)) at rm level
computed on US data and European data
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Export vs FDI: Estimation
estimate the following equation
log
SXjk
S Ijk
= αk + α1 log FPj + β1 log FREIGHTk + β2 logTARIFFjk
+β3sd (log S)j + γ1RDj + γ2KLj + εjk
where X and I stand for export and FDI, j is the sector, k the
destination country, S = sales, RD = R&D intensity, KL =
Capital-labor ratio.
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Export vs FDI: Evidence
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Other Theories of Multinational Firms
Helpman et al. (2004) is a model of horizontal FDI: multinationals
produce abroad to serve the local demand directly and save on
transportation costs
yet, a large fraction of FDI is vertical: rms move part of the
production process abroad to take advantage of low wages
a rm may decide to relocate part of production in low-wage
countries in two ways:
1 by opening a plant abroad becoming a multinational
2 by contracting with an independent supplier (o¤shoring)
recent models on the organization of the rm study when 1 is
preferred to 2:
I becoming a MNE entails higher xed costs
I contracting with an independent supplier may be costly, particularly
when goods are highly specic and contracts incomplete
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More Empirics: Treer (AER, 2004)
focus on Canada-US FTA (started Jan 1, 1989)
data at industry and plant level for the period 1980-1996
why US-Canada FTA?
1 clearly dened policy experiment (no possible confusion with
Macroeconomic shocks and other market reforms)
2 allows to identify policy-mandated tari¤ measures
3 reciprocal agreement reducing Import and Export tari¤s between US
and CAN, not vs ROW
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Tari¤s Before and After 01/01/1989
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Tari¤s
tari¤s in the graph are average tari¤s
in 1988, 25% of Canadian industries had tari¤s above 10%
FTA mandates reducing tari¤s once a year on January 1, starting 1989
FTA-mandated tari¤ (τUSit , τ
CAN
it ) for industry i in year t = dashed
line (ROW) - solid line (CAN, US)
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Questions
what are the the e¤ects of FTA-mandated tari¤ cut on
1 employment
2 employment of skilled vs unskilled labor
3 labor productivity
4 total wages
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Estimation Strategy (I)
pre-FTA changes (control):
∆τci0 =
τci1986   τci1980
1986  1980
∆yi0 =
yi1986   yi1980
1986  1980
with c 2 fCA,USg
FTA-period changes (treatment):
∆τci1 =
τci1996   τci1989
1996  1988
∆yi1 =
yi1996   yi1988
1996  1988
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Estimation Strategy (II)
1 estimate for industry i
∆yi1   ∆yi0 = θ + βCA

∆τCAi1   ∆τCAi0

+ βUS

∆τUSi1   ∆τUSi0

+controls + νi
2 estimate for plant k in industry i
∆yik1   ∆yik0 = θ + βCA

∆τCAi1   ∆τCAi0

+ βUS

∆τUSi1   ∆τUSi0

+controls + characterik1980 + νik
3 use both OLS and IV
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Results
employment: total impact of FTA '  5% both at industry and plant
level, mainly due to CA tari¤s#
employment of production workers:
I CA tari¤s# !  14% at industry,  9% at plant level
I US tari¤s# !  0 both at industry and plant level
I total impact of FTA '  8% at industry,  4% at plant level
employment of non-production workers:
I CA tari¤s# !  0 at industry,  14% at plant level
I US tari¤s# !  0 both at industry and plant level
skill upgrading:
I non-production/production workers " more at industry level ! shift to
n-p-worker-intensive plants
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Results (II)
labor productivity:
I CA tari¤s# ! up to +15% at industry,  0 at plant level (exit of least
productive?)
I US tari¤s# !  0 at industry, up to +14% at plant level (entry of
young new exporters?)
I Total impact of FTA ' +7.4% both at industry and plant level
total wages
I All workers: +3% both at industry and plant level (same e¤ect for US
and CA tari¤s)
I P workers: +2/3% both at industry and plant level
I NP workers:  0 at industry level, +3% at plant level
output: +6% in export-oriented plants,  0 elsewhere
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Summary
consequences of a bilateral drop in tari¤s:
1 employment drops, mainly in import-competing plants/industries
2 employment of production workers drops by more ! shifts to
non-production-worker-intensive plants
3 labor productivity increases at industry level due to import penetration
(consistent with selection in Melitz)
4 labor productivity increases at plant level due to export opportunities
(invest in technical progress to exploit a bigger market?)
5 wages dont fall
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Basic E¤ects of Trade Tari¤s and Taxes
for a given good x , dene:
p = world price
p = domestic price
if no tari¤, p = p
if good x is imported, an ad valorem tari¤ of t implies:
pt = (1+ t) p
the e¤ect of an import tari¤ or an export tax is to drive a wedge
between domestic and world prices
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Welfare Losses and Gains from an Import Tari¤ (small
country)
D
c, y0 y0
pt
p*
S
yt ct c0
a c
b d
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Welfare Losses and Gains from an Import Tari¤ (small
country)
1 Price increases (pt > p) and imported quantity falls (ct   yt <
c0   y0)
2 Cosumersloss = a+ b+ c + d
3 Tari¤ revenue = c ! rebated to consumers
4 Firmsgain = a
5 Welfare loss = b+ d
6 If only tari¤ on good 1, no tax on 2 ! p1p2 " ! redistributional e¤ects
(Stolper-Samuelson)
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Why do countries use protection?
1 if a country can a¤ect world prices, it may benet from a tari¤
(optimum tari¤s)
2 second-best world: add a distortion (tari¤s) to alleviate another one
3 political economy:
1 median voter and the e¤ects of trade
2 status quo bias against globalization in presence of uncertainty on who
is going to gain from trade (within a country)
3 lobbying
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Optimum Tari¤
when a country is large relative to the world market, a fall in its
imports will lower the import price (pt < p)
each consumer is atomistic and does not internalize this e¤ect
a government that recognizes this e¤ect may want to restrict imports
(eg., through a tari¤) to enjoy lower import prices
a small tari¤ may lead to a favorable change in the terms of trade
(price of export relative to the price of import)
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Welfare Losses and Gains from an Import Tari¤ (large
country)
D
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Welfare Losses and Gains from an Import Tari¤ (large
country)
1 Price increases (pt > p) ! imported quantity falls (ct   yt <
c0   y0) ! foreign price falls (pt < p)
2 Cosumersloss = a+ b+ c + d
3 Tari¤ revenue = c + e ! rebated to consumers
NOTE: e is extra revenue from pt < p (terms of trade e¤ect)
4 Firmsgain = a
5 Welfare gain = e   b  d > 0 if t is small enough!
6 If only tari¤ on good 1, no tax on 2 ! p1p2 " ! redistributional e¤ects
(Stolper-Samuelson)
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Optimum Tari¤: Analytical Argument (I)
optimality requires:
domestic import price = marginal cost of import
p =
∂C
∂m
total cost of import:
C = pm
marginal cost of import:
∂C
∂m
= p +m
∂p
∂m
= p

1+
∂p
∂m
m
p

Note: the marginal imported unit costs the price (p) plus the price
increase due to increased demand, applied to the whole import (m ∂p

∂m )
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Optimum Tari¤: Analytical Argument (II)
It follows that:
p = p (1+ timp) =
∂C
∂m
timp =
∂p
∂m
m
p
=
1
ζ
with ζ = elasticity of foreign supply (remember m = x)
the optimal tari¤ is higher the more sensitive the world price is to
changes in domestic imports
the optimal tari¤ is zero for ζ ! ∞, i.e. the s.o.e. above
the optimal tari¤ is positive if a country can a¤ect relative prices:
I large countries producing large quantities
I any country, even small, specialized in a good/variety (recall Krugman)
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Second-Best Policies
tari¤s are ine¢ cient
in presence of distortions, governments may prefer to alleviate another
ine¢ ciency by introducing a further distortion (tari¤s)
example: infant industries
I problem: young rms/industries may be credit constrained due to
nancial frictions
I how to help them overcome the credit constraint?
I solution 1: alleviate the nancial friction (e.g. liberalizations)/ give
subsidies
I shortcoming: requires redistribution/ erosion of rents ! politically
di¢ cult
I solution 2: set a tari¤ to "protect young industries" from foreign
competitors
I shortcoming: distortion
I advantage: foreigners bear part of the burden ! politically more viable
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Political Economy and Trade Policy
trade policy is decided by politicians
politicians act to please the majority of voters, in order to be
re-elected
given that trade policy has redistributional implications, it can be
used to please some sectors of the society to gain votes
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The Median Voter and Tari¤s
recall: trade helps the relatively abundant factor (Stolper-Samuelson
theorem)
in poor countries the relatively abundant factor is L, in rich countries
it is K
however, in all countries the majority of voters are labor-owners rather
than capital-owners (capital is relatively concentrated)
result (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994): capital-abundant (rich) countries
should set import tari¤s, labor-abundant countries (LDCs) import
subsidies (not observed in reality)
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The Median Voter and Tari¤s: Evidence
Dutt and Mitra (JIE 2002) draw an additional, testable, prediction:
I higher inequality, i.e. lower K/L endowment of the median vote,
implies higher (lower) tari¤s in rich (poor) countries
estimate on a cross-section of 51 countries
TRi = α0 + α1INEQi + α2INEQi  (K/L)i
+α3 (K/L)i + βXi + εi
test if ∂TR/∂INEQ is positive (negative) for low (high) (K/L), i.e.
α1 < 0 and α2 > 0
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Lobbying: Protection for Sale Model (Grossman and
Helpman, AER 1994)
in the US and other countries, lobbies can inuence politicians
in di¤erent industries there might be special interest groups that
stand to gain from protection
trade policy can be used as a means to redistribute prots from one
sector to another in order to please lobbies
sectors where lobbies are more organized and more powerful get more
protection
the model can explain the structure of tari¤s across sectors
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Lobbying and Tari¤s: Evidence
Non-testable result: organized sectors get import tari¤s,
non-organized sectors get import subsidies (not observed in reality)
Goldberg and Maggi (AER 1999) provide supportive evidence on
testable predictions:
I in organized sectors, protection increases with output/import ratio
(raising rmssurplus, a in g.7)
I in organized sectors, protection decreases with import demand elasticity
(reducing consumersloss, b+d in g.7)
I use US data on 3-digit industries
I protection is measured by non-tari¤ barriers, since politicians cannot
manipulate tari¤s at their will
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Status Quo Bias and the Persistence of Protectionism
(Fernandez and Rodrik, AER 1991)
uncertainty about the e¤ects of globalization may help explain the
persistence of protectionism even when trade can benet the majority
suppose a trade reform benets 60% of the electorate and harms the
remaining 40%
suppose 40% of the electorate is employed in the export sector and is
sure to benet
the remaining 60% (the majority) has a 2/3 chance to lose, 1/3 to
gain
! the majority will vote against the trade reform
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Optimum Tari¤: a caveat
if the other country retaliates and imposes a similar tari¤, the relative
price p will not change ! no country will gain
yet, both countries will loose because the equilibrium with tari¤s is
closer to the autarky point: some GFT do not materialize
the fact that if all countries impose a tari¤ all countries end up being
worse-o¤ is just an indication that the free-trade equilibrium is Pareto
e¢ cient
in fact, the "optimal" tari¤ is "optimal" from the viewpoint of an
individual country only
if we want to maximize world welfare the optimal policy is free-trade
if all countries expect retaliation, why do they set a positive tari¤?
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Prisoners Dilemma and Trade Policy
suppose countries A and B can choose between the optimumtari¤
(t = t) and a zero tari¤
payo¤s (common knowledge):
tA = 0 tA = t
tB = 0 UA = 5;UB = 5 UA = 7;UB = 0
tB = t UA = 0;UB = 7 UA = 2;UB = 2
no matter what county B does, country A is better-o¤ by choosing
tA = t ! unique Nash equilibrium is: tA = tB = t
yet, free-trade is Pareto superior than the equilibrium
free trade can be achieved if countries can cooperate and can commit
to set t = 0
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Bagwell & Staiger (1999)
reciprocity and non-discrimination can neutralize TOT e¤ects
simplest 2 country 2 good case
good 1: home export, world price = 1 (numeraire)
good 2: home import, world price = p
a tari¤ cut satises reciprocity if import levels (m and m) rise equally
in both countries (exports: x and x)
reciprocity : pt0∆m = ∆m

trade balance : ∆m = pt1x

t1   pt0xt0
market clearing : pt1x

t1   pt0xt0 = pt1mt1   pt0mt0
! pt1 = pt0
no change in TOT
in a multi-country world, non-discrimination is needed too
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Reciprocity with Discrimination: Preferential Trade
Agreements
when two or more countries remove all the barriers to trade between
them, they form a PTA
PTA do not comply with non-discrimination
there are several types of PTAs
1 free-trade area (FTA): countries maintain di¤erent external tari¤s
2 custom union (CU): countries involved choose a common external tari¤
3 common market: CU + free factor mobility
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PTA and Regional Trade Agreements: Facts
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Welfare E¤ects of PTAs
a PTA can a¤ect trade patterns as follows:
1 trade creation: promote more trade between PTA members
2 trade diversion: countries may stop importing some goods from outside
the PTA
typically, trade creation is benecial, while trade diversion may entail
a welfare loss for countries forming a PTA
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Trade Creation: Example
production price of commodity x in countries A, B and C:
country A B C
price 35 26 20
100% tari¤ 52 40
50% tari¤ 39 30
with a 100% tari¤, county A prefer not to import ! cost of x = 35
a PTA with either B or C lowers the cost of x in country A (to 26 or
20)
x becomes cheaper in A and this improves welfare
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Trade Diversion: Example
production price of commodity x in countries A, B and C:
country A B C
price 35 26 20
100% tari¤ 52 40
50% tari¤ 39 30
with a 50% tari¤, country A imports x from C, with a total cost of x
= price (30) - tari¤ revenue (10) = 20
if A forms a PTA with B, it switches imports from C (price 30) to B
(price 26)
this PTA reduces domestic welfare: consumers must pay 26 while
before they were e¤ectively paying 20
a PTA may lower welfare when it diverts trade articially from low
cost producers to high cost producers
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Kemp and Wan Theorem
Kemp and Wan (1976): a CU can always be designed in a way so as
to necessarily increase world welfare
intuition:
by setting properly the external tari¤, it is possible to
keep imports from the rest of the world xed ! no
trade diversion
yet, trade creation between the CU members will
increase welfare
problem of the Kemp and Wan rule: it may require transfers between
countries
complex transfer schemes are di¢ cult to implement in reality
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Reciprocity and Non-Discrimination: Multilateralism and
the WTO
after World War II, countries recognized that setting tari¤s
uncooperatively carried the risk of damaging protectionism
to facilitate reciprocal tari¤ reductions, the GATT was formed in 1948
by the US and other 22 nations
the GATT become the WTO in 1995
WTO now involves 153 countries (since July 2008)
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The Principles of the WTO
reciprocity: if one country reduces a tari¤, it must obtain a similar
"concession" from the trading partners
I exception: special and di¤erential treatment for developing countries
non discrimination: the same tari¤ should apply to all trading partners
I exception: PTAs are allowed by the WTO
free trade: gradually, through multilateral negotiations
predictable trade
fair competition: no subsidies and dumping
pro-LDCs
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The Functions of the WTO
1 administering WTO trade agreements
2 handling trade disputes: help enforce reciprocity and
non-discrimination
3 forum for trade negotiations: rounds
4 monitoring national trade policies
5 technical assistance and training for developing countries
6 cooperation with other international organizations
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Trade Rounds
a package approach to trade negotiations
benets of a larger package (more issues on the table):
I can secure more agreements with one negotiation
I makes it easier to reach agreements through trade-o¤s among
countries on di¤erent issues
I developing countries have a greater chance of being listened
shortcoming:
I focusing on too many issues may complicate things
the package (agenda) is prepared by a Preparatory Committee and set
by the governments of member states at Ministerial Conferences
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Trade Rounds
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The Uruguay Round (1986-1994)
15 subjects in the agenda
123 participating countries
25.000-page Agreement
main achievements:
I birth of WTO
I agriculture: introduce bounds to tari¤s
I set/clarify rules on temporary safeguard measures, subsidies and
antidumping, dispute settlements
I GATS (general agreement on trade in services)
I TRIPS (trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights )
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The Doha Round (2001-?)
main focus: improve trading perspectives for developing countries and
implementation of WTO agreements
153 participating countries
19-21 subjects in the Doha Development Agenda, the main:
I implementation of WTO agreements (mainly in developing and LDCs)
I agriculture
I services
I non-agricultural products market access (NAMA)
I TRIPS
I trade facilitation
I WTO rules on antidumping & subsidies and RTAs
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The Doha Round (2001-?)
19-21 subjects in the Doha Development Agenda, the main:
I dispute settlement
I trade and the environment
I e-commerce
I trade, debt and nance
I trade and technology transfer
I technical cooperation and capacity building
I LDCs
I special and di¤erential treatment (for developing and LDCs)
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The Doha Round (2001-?)
negotiations take place in the Trade Negotiation Committee and
specic negotiating groups
stages of negotiation:
I Geneva 2003: agreement on special treatment in services for
least-developed countries
I Geneva 2004: dene a "Framework" for the negotiations on
agricultural and non-agricultural market access
I Hong Kong 2005: narrowing positions
I Geneva 2008: set another package for negotiations on agriculture and
NAMA
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The Doha Round (2001-?)
principles of negotiations:
I single undertaking: item by item + nothing is agreed until everything
is agreed
I participation: of members and observers, only members decide
I transparency
I special and di¤erential treatment: of developing and LDCs
I sustainable development
I subjects not negotiated: high priority to issues not requiring
negotiations
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The Doha Round: Main Proposals
AMA and NAMA (estimated global gains = $160 billion):
I tari¤ reduction on goods by 20%
I abolition of export and domestic subsidies to agriculture
I cuts in bound tari¤s ! less uncertainty on future tari¤s
services: improvement by 10% w.r.t. Uruguay Round (though actual
restrictions are already lower than committed ones)
LDCs: duty-free quota-free access to market in developed and some
deving countries + no requirement to cut tari¤s
Trade Facilitation Agreement and aid-for-trade initiative to help
institutional reforms to facilitate trade in poor countries
I WTO rules
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The Doha Round: Main Problems
full trade liberalization in certain sectors (14 among the most traded
goods, like chemicals, electronics and electric equipments, industrial
machinery, etc)
special safeguard mechanism (SSM) on agricultural products: e.g.
raise tari¤s or restrict quotas in response to very bad shocks
US antidumping procedures (zeroing of dumping margins) a¤ecting
mainly exporters from deving countries
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The Doha Round: What Didnt Work
AMA and NAMA:
I the top-down approach to tari¤ cuts: cut more in the more protected
sectors (politically more costly, gives rise to exception requests)
I no rule to deal with exceptions
I no explicit consideration for food security and price insulation (to lower
volatility)
services:
I governments unwilling to commit to liberalization (keep power, weak
regulatory skills, weak international regulatory coordination)
implementation of aid-for-trade
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